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Self-Selective Social Choice Functions

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  • SLINKO, Arkadii
  • KORAY, Semih

Abstract

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.

Suggested Citation

  • SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 2006-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-21
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2156
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, EconWPA.
    2. Salvador Barber?Author-Name: Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es, "undated". "Stable Condorcet Rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 539.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
    4. Nicolas Houy, 2004. "A note on the impossibility of a set of constitutions stable at different levels," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. Semih Koray, 2000. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbarad- Satterthwaite Theorems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 981-996, July.
    6. Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen, 2002. "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 263-277, August.
    7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    8. Semih Koray & Bulent Unel, 2003. "Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 495-507, June.
    9. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Semih Koray & Arkadii Slinko, 2008. "Self-selective social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 129-149, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social choice function; social choice corresndence; self-selectivity; resistance to cloning;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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