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A note on the impossibility of a set of constitutions stable at different levels




We demonstrate that no set of neutral and different social choice correspondences exists, so that, if proposed to a group of individuals, it leads to a uniquely defined society, stable in an intuitive sense. Weakening this latter condition makes it possible to reintroduce possibility. This appearance reveals itself as only transitory if seen as a way to escape the multiplicity of solutions problem in social choice theory. This last result is obtained by generalizing the concept of stability to higher levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Houy, 2004. "A note on the impossibility of a set of constitutions stable at different levels," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04039

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
    2. Semih Koray, 2000. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbarad- Satterthwaite Theorems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 981-996, July.
    3. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
    4. Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
    2. Diss, Mostapha & Louichi, Ahmed & Merlin, Vincent & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012. "An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 57-66.
    3. SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 2006-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.

    More about this item


    Social choice correspondence; stability; self-selectivity.;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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