A note on the impossibility of a set of constitutions stable at different levels
We demonstrate that no set of neutral and different social choice correspondences exists, so that, if proposed to a group of individuals, it leads to a uniquely defined society, stable in an intuitive sense. Weakening this latter condition makes it possible to reintroduce possibility. This appearance reveals itself as only transitory if seen as a way to escape the multiplicity of solutions problem in social choice theory. This last result is obtained by generalizing the concept of stability to higher levels.
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- Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June.
- Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
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- Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
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