Democratically Elected Aristocracies
The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that ev- ery vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with differential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived as having with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself accord- ing to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the differential weights assigned in the first round. We analyze the formal and the philosophical reasons that support the model.
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