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Self-Selection Consistent Functions

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Abstract

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

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  • Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber?, "undated". "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 468.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:468.00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June.
    3. repec:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:45:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 318-346, February.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1997. "Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 45, pages 219-231.
    6. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    7. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diss, Mostapha & Louichi, Ahmed & Merlin, Vincent & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012. "An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 57-66.
    2. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 52-67.
    3. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
    4. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha & Saran, Rene, 2013. "Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 454-459.
    5. Jackson, M.O.Matthew O. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2004. "The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 278-308, April.
    6. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
    7. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2008. "Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 165-183, January.
    8. Daeyoung Jeong & Semin Kim, 2017. "Interim Self-Stable Decision Rules," Working papers 2017rwp-108, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    9. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
    10. Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen, 2006. "Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 185-200, July.
    11. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    12. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
    13. Semih Koray & Arkadii Slinko, 2008. "Self-selective social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 129-149, June.
    14. SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 2006-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    15. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2012. "Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 490-509.
    16. SLINKO, Arkadii & KORAY, Semih, 2006. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche 18-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    17. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    18. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.
    19. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Common Decision Scheme," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1077, Econometric Society.
    21. Azrieli, Yaron & Kim, Semin, 2016. "On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 376-389.
    22. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consistency; Condorcet criterion;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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