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Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

  • BOCHET, Olivier
  • GORDON, Sidartha

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

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Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2008-07.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2008-07
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  1. GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo," Cahiers de recherche 2006-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200507, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
  3. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen, 2002. "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 263-277, August.
  5. Jackson, M.O.Matthew O. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2004. "The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 278-308, April.
  6. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. BOCHET, Olivier & GORDON, Sidartha, 2008. "Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Cahiers de recherche 07-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  9. Ehlers, L., 2001. "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle," Cahiers de recherche 2001-25, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  10. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
  11. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May.
  12. Salvador Barbera & Carmen Bevia, 2000. "Self-Selection Consistent Choices," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1322, Econometric Society.
  13. Anna Bogomolnaia & Antonio Nicolo, 2005. "Stable Assignment of Public Facilities under Congestion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 65-91, 02.
  14. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
  15. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
  16. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
  17. Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
  18. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier.
  19. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  20. Ching, S. & Thomson, W., 1993. "Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single- Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  21. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
  22. Thomson, W., 1992. "The Replacement Principle in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 340, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  23. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:4:p:769-83 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
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