Locating libraries on a street
Hotelling (1929) studied two competing firms choosing their locations on a street. We consider instead a planner who builds two identical public facilities (e.g., libraries, parks, bridges, etc). We ask a normative question: Where should the planner build these facilities? We prove an axiomatic characterization of the efficient social choice rules that satisfy what is called the replacement-domination, which is a formulation of the idea of "solidarity" among the agents.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 26 November 1997/Accepted: 28 February 2000|
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