Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle
We study the problem of locating two public Godds for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval.
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|Date of creation:||2001|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May.
- Hervé Moulin, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-783.
- Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997.
"Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
- Salvador Barbera, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Discussion Papers 1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-184.
- William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
- Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996. "Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
- Thomson, W., 1992. "The Replacement Principle in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 340, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2001. "Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 239-250, March.
- Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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