Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle
We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).
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