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Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

Listed author(s):
  • Sidartha Gordon

    ()

We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are constrained by attributes possessed by the alternatives (Nehring and Puppe, Games Econ Behavior 59:132–153, 2007a ; Nehring and Puppe, J Econ Theory 135:269–305, 2007b ). Solidarity conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept fixed either all weakly lose or they all weakly win. Population-monotonicity (Thomson, Math Oper Res 8:319–326, 1983a ; Thomson, J Econ Theory 31:211–226, 1983b ) applies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacement-domination (Moulin, Q J Econ 102:769–783, 1987 ) applies to changes in preferences. We show that either solidarity property is compatible with voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if the attribute space is quasi-median (Nehring, Social aggregation without veto, Mimeo, 2004 ), and with Pareto-efficiency if and only if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-014-0809-8
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Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 44 (2015)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 13-29

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:13-29
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0809-8
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  1. Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
  2. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December.
  3. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2005. "Voting by committees under constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 185-205, June.
  4. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May.
  5. Hervé Moulin, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-783.
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  8. Danilov, Vladimir I., 1994. "The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 123-131, April.
  9. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-184.
  10. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.
  11. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
  12. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
  13. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October.
  14. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  15. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
  16. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2010. "Abstract Arrowian aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 467-494, March.
  17. Bu, Nanyang, 2013. "Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 559-561.
  18. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
  19. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  20. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
  21. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
  22. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "Stability and voting by committees with exit," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 229-247, October.
  23. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
  24. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
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