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Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju

Abstract

In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separableâ€\x9D preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 1-17, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:1:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-0576-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.

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