An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordssocial choice; preference aggregation; strategy-proofness; weak-veto rules;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-02-26 (All new papers)
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