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An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation

Listed author(s):
  • Stergios, Athanasoglou

A new class of preference-aggregation rules is proposed, weak-veto rules. Weak-veto rules are applicable in settings characterized by strong pre-existing views on the desirability of different outcomes, whose recommendations should be modified only in the presence of strenuous opposition. They are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and unanimity-basedness. When non-manipulability requirements are strengthened to K-strategy-proofness, the positive results are weakened, except for the case of three alternatives and a sub-class of weak-veto rules based on Kemeny distances. This demonstrates the compatibility of stronger efficiency and non-manipulability properties for the three-alternative model.

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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 363.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2017
Date of revision: 18 Feb 2017
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:363
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  1. Jean Lainé & Ali Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Hyper-stable social welfare functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 157-182, January.
  2. Barberà, Salvador, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 731-831 Elsevier.
  3. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  4. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
  5. Athanasoglou, Stergios, 2016. "Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 156-167.
  6. Harless, Patrick, 2016. "Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 73-87.
  7. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
  8. Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin, 2016. "Bounded response of aggregated preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 1-15.
  9. Shin Sato, 2015. "Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 133-149, January.
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