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An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation

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  • Stergios, Athanasoglou

Abstract

A new class of preference-aggregation rules is proposed, weak-veto rules. Weak-veto rules are applicable in settings characterized by strong pre-existing views on the desirability of different outcomes, whose recommendations should be modified only in the presence of strenuous opposition. They are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and unanimity-basedness. When non-manipulability requirements are strengthened to K-strategy-proofness, the positive results are weakened, except for the case of three alternatives and a sub-class of weak-veto rules based on Kemeny distances. This demonstrates the compatibility of stronger efficiency and non-manipulability properties for the three-alternative model.

Suggested Citation

  • Stergios, Athanasoglou, 2017. "An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation," Working Papers 363, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:363
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social choice; preference aggregation; strategy-proofness; weak-veto rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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