Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
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- Can, Burak & Csóka, Péter & Ergin, Emre, 2017. "How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Stergios, Athanasoglou, 2017. "An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation," Working Papers 363, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2017.
- Burak Can & Peter Csoka & Emre Ergin, 2017. "How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1713, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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Keywordsstrategyproofness; social choice; dominant strategies; domain restrictions; voting;
- I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
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