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Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria

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  • Athanasoglou, Stergios

Abstract

Suppose a group of agents submit strict linear orderings over a set of alternatives. An aggregation rule is a function mapping this information into a unique social ordering. In a recent paper, Bossert and Sprumont (2014) introduced betweenness-based notions of efficiency and strategyproofness for aggregation rules and identified three broad classes of rules which satisfy them. The current paper suggests that such betweenness-based requirements may at times be too weak and introduces stronger concepts based on Kemeny distances, namely K-efficiency and K-strategyproofness. When there are three alternatives, all Condorcet–Kemeny rules are both K-efficient and K-strategyproof for a large subdomain of profiles. Moreover, all status-quo rules are K-strategyproof, though not K-efficient. When the number of alternatives exceeds three none of the rules discussed by Bossert and Sprumont satisfies K-strategyproofness, while just Condorcet–Kemenyrules satisfy K-efficiency. The existence of a nondictatorial and onto K-strategyproof rule is an open question.

Suggested Citation

  • Athanasoglou, Stergios, 2016. "Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 156-167.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:156-167
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Katherine Baldiga & Jerry Green, 2013. "Assent-maximizing social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 439-460, February.
    2. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
    3. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December.
    4. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    5. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
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    7. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Can, Burak & Csóka, Péter & Ergin, Emre, 2017. "How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    2. Stergios, Athanasoglou, 2017. "An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation," Working Papers 363, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2017.
    3. Burak Can & Peter Csoka & Emre Ergin, 2017. "How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1713, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aggregation rule; Strategyproofness; Efficiency; Kemeny distance;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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