Strategy-proofness and unimodality in bounded distributive lattices
It is shown that a social choice rule f : X N ? X as defined on a bounded distributive lattice (X, ) is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of unimodal total preorders on X if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants. The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold in more specialized unimodal domains fails in such a more general setting.
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