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Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Cahuc

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Stéphane Carcillo

    (OCDE / OECD - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bérengère Patault

    (UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam = University of Amsterdam)

  • Flavien Moreau

    (International Monetary Fund (IMF))

Abstract

This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo & Bérengère Patault & Flavien Moreau, 2024. "Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance," Post-Print hal-05446842, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05446842
    DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvad046
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-05446842v1
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    Cited by:

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    2. Tu, Hao & Yang, Shenggang & Dong, Minyi & Dai, Pengyi, 2025. "Judicial Independence and Corporate Total Factor Productivity: Evidence from provincial court centralization," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 1946-1961.
    3. Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa & Michael Visser, 2022. "Simultaneous Decision Making of Juries: Evidence From the Paris Labor Court," CIRED Working Papers hal-04104190, HAL.
    4. Camilo Abbate & Jeffrey Cross & Richard Uhrig, 2025. "Video assistant referee and home field advantage: Implications for referee bias," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 91(3), pages 1176-1196, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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