Innovation, information, lobby and tort law under uncertainty
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- Julien Jacob & Caroline Orset, 2024. "Innovation, information, lobby and tort law under uncertainty," Working Papers of BETA 2024-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
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More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2020-07-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-INO-2020-07-13 (Innovation)
- NEP-LAW-2020-07-13 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-ORE-2020-07-13 (Operations Research)
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