Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Argenton, C. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2014. "Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2014-078, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Angelo Castaldo & Marco Grantaliano & Nicola Faraone, 2018. "Sanzioni antitrust e vaglio giurisdizionale: uno sguardo alla tecnica di quantificazione," Public Finance Research Papers 33, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome.
More about this item
Keywordsantitrust fines; business cycles; managing incentives;
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2013-04-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2013-04-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-13 (Microeconomics)
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