Managerial Effort Incentives and Market Collusion
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- Cécile Aubert, 2009. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382709, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382711, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382224, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382714, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Klaus M. Schmidt, 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 191-213.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jaideep Chowdhury, 2014. "Impact of financial constraint on incentive compensation and product market behavior," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 115-124.
- Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Fabra, Natalia & Motta, Massimo, 2013. "Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 9290, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johannes Paha, 2013. "The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201328, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
More about this item
Keywordscollusion; managerial incentives; leniency programs;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-05-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-05-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-05-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2010-05-22 (Industrial Organization)
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