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Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost

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  • Alexander, Cindy R.
  • Cohen, Mark A.

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  • Alexander, Cindy R. & Cohen, Mark A., 1999. "Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 1-34, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:5:y:1999:i:1:p:1-34
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Alexander, C.R. & Cohen, M.A., 1996. "Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? An Agency Explanation," Papers 96-07, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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    6. Baysinger, Barry D & Butler, Henry N, 1985. "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, Spring.
    7. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    8. Espen Eckbo, B. & Verma, Savita, 1994. "Managerial shareownership, voting power, and cash dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 33-62.
    9. Mason Gerety & Kenneth Lehn, 1997. "The causes and consequences of accounting fraud," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(7-8), pages 587-599.
    10. Szewczyk, Samuel H. & Tsetsekos, George P., 1992. "State intervention in the market for corporate control : The case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 3-23.
    11. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    12. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    13. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    14. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Terry, Rory L., 1994. "Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-390, June.
    15. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    16. C. G. Holderness & R. S. Kroszner & D. P. Sheehan, 1996. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? The Evolution of Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 131, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    17. Segerson, Kathleen & Tietenberg, Tom, 1992. "The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: An economic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 179-200, September.
    18. Chang, Saeyoung & Mayers, David, 1992. "Managerial vote ownership and shareholder wealth *1: Evidence from employee stock ownership plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 103-131, August.
    19. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
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    21. Kini, Omesh & Kracaw, William & Mian, Shehzad, 1995. "Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 383-412.
    22. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September.
    23. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    24. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    25. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
    26. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    27. Lehn, Kenneth & Poulsen, Annette, 1989. " Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 771-787, July.
    28. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    29. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    30. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    31. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    32. Brickley, James A & James, Christopher M, 1987. "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 161-180, April.
    33. Schranz, Mary S, 1993. "Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 299-326, April.
    34. Kole, Stacey R., 1995. "Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership data," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 413-435.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wsi:qjfxxx:v:07:y:2017:i:01:n:s2010139216500142 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, 2007. "The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 698-713.
    3. Haß, Lars Helge & Müller, Maximilian A. & Vergauwe, Skrålan, 2015. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 251-267.
    4. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 243-252.
    6. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1999. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 309-342, April.
    7. Ozcan, Gul Berna & Cokgezen, Murat, 2003. "Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization: The Case of Anatolian Holding Companies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 2061-2084, December.
    8. Daniel Rubinfeld, 2000. "The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct Broadcast Satellite Assets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 16(2), pages 193-209, March.
    9. repec:oup:jcomle:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:1-30. is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:eee:jbrese:v:76:y:2017:i:c:p:145-158 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Philipp Festerling, 2005. "Cartel Prosecution and Leniency Programs: Corporate versus Individual Leniency," Economics Working Papers 2005-20, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    12. Alexander, Cindy R & Arlen, Jennifer & Cohen, Mark A, 1999. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 393-422, April.
    13. Philip Strahan, 1998. "Securities class actions, corporate governance and managerial agency problems," Research Paper 9816, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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