Why not adopt a loser-pays-all rule in criminal litigation?
In this paper we consider the potential effects that the application of a loser-pays-all rule may have on criminal litigation, including the decision to prosecute, criminal deterrence and legal error. We find that the effects of fee shifting on deterrence and on miscarriage of justice go in opposite directions. We also look at the effects of this rule on the rate of settlements (plea-bargaining) and when one party is wealth-constrained. We apply the insights of our model to current policy discussions such as the use of RICO proceedings and the financing of enforcement authorities in the United States.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
- Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, .
"Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defence Expenditure,"
00/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998.
"Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 141-57, January.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998. "Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 519-35, June.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2009. "The English rule with payments upfront," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 177-181, December.
- Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, 2011. "The Brady Rule May Hurt the Innocent," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 168-200.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2008.
"Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution,"
2008-04, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
- Miceli, Thomas J, 1990. "Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 189-201, Spring.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Snyder, Edward A & Hughes, James W, 1990. "The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-80, Fall.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1996.
"Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 269-280, Summer.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," NBER Working Papers 4507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hylton, Keith N., 2002. "An asymmetric-information model of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 153-175, August.
- Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March.
- Vincy Fon & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, 2007. "State Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on Crime Levels," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 269-284, June.
- Katz, Avery, 1987. "Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 143-76, Fall.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000.
"Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective,"
Managerial and Decision Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 243-252.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective," Economics Working Papers 529, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
- Hause, John C, 1989. "Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 157-79, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:2:p:233-241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.