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Continuous Time and Communication in a Public-goods Experiment

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  • Charness, Gary
  • Oprea, Ryan
  • Friedman, Dan

Abstract

We investigate the nature of continuous-time strategic interactions in public-goodsgames. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous timewhile in another they make them only at discrete points of time. The effect of continuous timeis muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas; the data suggest thatwidespread coordination problems are to blame. With a rich communication protocol, thesecoordination problems disappear and the median subject contributes fully to the public good,with no time decay. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half aseffective in discrete time.

Suggested Citation

  • Charness, Gary & Oprea, Ryan & Friedman, Dan, 2012. "Continuous Time and Communication in a Public-goods Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5404914p, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt5404914p
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    Cited by:

    1. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee & Nunnari, Salvatore, 2017. "Durable coalitions and communication: Public versus private negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:276-296 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alain Cohn & Tobias Gesche & Michel Maréchal, 2018. "Honesty in the digital age," ECON - Working Papers 280, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Sääksvuori, Lauri & Ramalingam, Abhijit, 2015. "Bargaining under surveillance: Evidence from a three-person ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 66-78.
    5. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
    6. repec:eee:jeborg:v:140:y:2017:i:c:p:91-119 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016. "Let'S Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 943-974, August.
    8. Tasneem, Dina & Engle-Warnick, Jim & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017. "An experimental study of a common property renewable resource game in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 91-119.
    9. repec:spr:jeicoo:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11403-016-0172-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 587-616, March.
    11. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2015. "Rich communication, social motivations, and coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer: A laboratory investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 146-159.
    12. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:143-156 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:915-935 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Charness, Gary & Brandts, Jordi & Ellman, Matthew, 2012. "Let’s talk: How communication affects contract design," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6z24s6rv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    15. Fehr, Dietmar & Sutter, Matthias, 2016. "Gossip and the Efficiency of Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 9704, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    16. Gangadharan, Lata & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 143-156.
    17. Charness, Gary & Cooper, David & Grossman, Zachary, 2015. "Silence is Golden: Â Communication Costs and Team Problem Solving," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3n25b620, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    18. Brüggemann, Julia & Crosetto, Paolo & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2016. "Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation. Experimental evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 2054-2068.
    19. Feltovich, Nick & Grossman, Philip J., 2015. "How does the effect of pre-play suggestions vary with group size? Experimental evidence from a threshold public-good game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 263-280.
    20. repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:93-108 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social and Behavioral Sciences; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; continuous-time games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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