Social Norms and Moral Hazard
The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more talented, but talent is private information and individuals cunningly choose effort so as to manipulate the public perception of their talent. We analyze the workings of a social insurance system in this setting. It turns out that social norms may mitigate moral hazard. However, the distribution of social status in society will not be uniform.
|Date of creation:||25 Nov 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Journal, 2001, pages 506-525.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden|
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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