Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
- Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 331-339, May.
- Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015.
"Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Post-Print halshs-01116843, HAL.
- Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
- Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
More about this item
Keywords(Maskin) Monotonicity Moore-Repullo-set Nash implementation No veto power;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:283-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.