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Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

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Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still ‘acceptable’ at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash Equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

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  • Anand Chopra & Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2025. "Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 1911, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1911
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    1. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2017. "Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2243-2277, August.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Virtual Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 8, pages 263-317, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2023. "A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions," Post-Print hal-04198678, HAL.
    5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
    6. Bochet, Olivier & Maniquet, François, 2010. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 99-108, January.
    7. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2023. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2517-2554.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
    10. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
    11. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
    12. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "Corrigendum to "Voluntary implementation": J. Econ. Theor. 98 (2001) 1-25," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 204-205, May.
    13. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January.
    14. Ollar, Mariann & Penta, Antonio, 2024. "Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions," TSE Working Papers 24-1558, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    15. Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms: a simple full characterization," Papers 2211.05431, arXiv.org.
    16. Penta, Antonio, 2015. "Robust dynamic implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 280-316.
    17. Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 603-611.
    18. Healy, Paul J. & Peress, Michael, 2015. "Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 21-23.
    19. Korpela, Ville, 2010. "Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 283-285, September.
    20. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Constrained implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 546-567.
    21. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    22. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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