Report NEP-DES-2025-10-13
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Pauline Corblet & Jeremy Fox & Alfred Galichon, 2025, "Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.02737, Oct, revised Apr 2026.
- Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2025, "Incentive compatibility and belief restrictions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1918, Sep.
- Tonghui Qi, 2025, "Identification in Auctions with Truncated Transaction Prices," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.04464, Oct, revised Oct 2025.
- Anand Chopra & Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2025, "Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1911, Jun.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1906, May.
- Nathan Hancart, 2025, "The (No) Value of Commitment," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.07994, Oct.
- Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024, "Strategically robust implementation," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1893, Sep.
- Eugene Lim & Tzeh Yuan Neoh & Nicholas Teh, 2025, "Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.04624, Oct.
- Jinho Cha & Justin Yu & Eunchan Daniel Cha & Emily Yoo & Caedon Geoffrey & Hyoshin Song, 2025, "Mechanism design and equilibrium analysis of smart contract mediated resource allocation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.05504, Oct, revised Oct 2025.
- Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena & Matteo Triossi, 2024, "Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness under externalities," Working Papers, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, number 08, Oct.
- Maria Titova & Kun Zhang, 2025, "Persuasion with Verifiable Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.08251, Oct.
- Walter Bossert & Salvador Barberà, 2025, "A Characterization of Black's Voting Rule," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1515, Oct.
- Li, Bingbing & Förster, Manuel, 2025, "A dynamic model of authority in organizations," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 753, Sep.
- Andrea Di Giovan Paolo & Jose Higueras, 2025, "Persuasion in Lemons Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.01413, Oct.
- Xiyuan Ren & Zhenglei Ji & Joseph Y. J. Chow, 2025, "Distributional welfare impacts and compensatory transit strategies under NYC congestion pricing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.06416, Oct, revised Feb 2026.
- Yotam Gafni, 2025, "A Small Collusion is All You Need," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2510.05986, Oct, revised Dec 2025.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2025-10-13.html