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Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society

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  • Yaron Azrieli
  • Ritesh Jain
  • Semin Kim

Abstract

We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous -- the outcome is invariant to permutations of the reported values. We show that if there are two agents then expected welfare is always maximized by an ordinal majority rule, but with three or more agents there are environments in which cardinal mechanisms that take into account preference intensities outperform any ordinal mechanism.

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  • Yaron Azrieli & Ritesh Jain & Semin Kim, 2025. "Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society," Papers 2508.08055, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2508.08055
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.08055
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    1. Yaron Azrieli, 2018. "The price of ‘one person, one vote’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 353-385, February.
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    1. Yaron Azrieli & Ritesh Jain & Semin Kim, 2025. "Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society," Working papers 2025rwp-265, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.

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