Report NEP-MIC-2025-09-08

This is the archive for NEP-MIC, a report on new working papers in the area of Microeconomics. Jing-Yuan Chiou issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-MIC

The following items were announced in this report:

• Jo~ao Thereze & Udayan Vaidya, 2025. "Delegated Contracting," Papers 2508.19326, arXiv.org.
• Hiroto Sato & Konan Shimizu, 2025. "Value of History in Social Learning: Applications to Markets for History," Papers 2507.11029, arXiv.org.
• Maxwell Rosenthal, 2025. "Data-Driven Persuasion," Papers 2507.03203, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Samuel Safaryan, 2025. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," Papers 2508.19682, arXiv.org.
• Yaron Azrieli & Ritesh Jain & Semin Kim, 2025. "Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society," Papers 2508.08055, arXiv.org.
• Zihao Li, 2025. "Digital Goods Monopoly: A Folk Theorem," Papers 2507.13137, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
• Christoph Carnehl & Anton Sobolev & Konrad Stahl & André Stenzel, 2025. "Designing Vertical Differentiation with Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_700, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Robin Ng & Greg Taylor, 2025. "Moderating Content-Hosting Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_698, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Vasilii Ivanik, 2025. "Contrarian Motives in Social Learning: Information Cascades with Nonconformist Preferences," Papers 2508.21446, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
• Andrea Benso, 2025. "A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network Games," Papers 2507.10148, arXiv.org.
• Hinata Kurashita & Ryosuke Sakai, 2025. "Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems," Papers 2507.09152, arXiv.org.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Anna Vlasova & Maria Ziskelevich, 2025. "Risky Advice and Reputational Bias," Papers 2508.19707, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
• Zhonghong Kuang & Yi Liu & Dong Wei, 2025. "Incentivizing Knowledge Transfers," Papers 2507.11018, arXiv.org.
• Yaron Azrieli & Rachana Das, 2025. "Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.09464, arXiv.org.
• Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2025. "Preference for Verifiability," Papers 2508.19585, arXiv.org.
• Krzysztof Mierzewski, 2025. "Probabilistically stable revision and comparative probability: a representation theorem and applications," Papers 2509.02495, arXiv.org.
• Shashwat Khare & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2025. "Stability in Many-to-One Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences," Papers 2507.07501, arXiv.org.
• Qing Hu & Ryo Masuyama & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2025. "Common Ownership with Downstream Firm's Voluntary Investment," Discussion Papers 2520, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
• Simon Finster & Patrick Loiseau & Simon Mauras & Mathieu Molina & Bary Pradelski, 2025. "Equitable Auctions," Post-Print hal-05225702, HAL.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Anna Vlasova, 2025. "Dynamic Delegation with Reputation Feedback," Papers 2508.19676, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
• Asen Kochov & Yangwei Song, 2025. "The Folk Theorem with Endogenous Discounting and Unobserved Mixtures," CESifo Working Paper Series 12066, CESifo.
• Georgy Lukyanov & Konstantin Popov & Shubh Lashkery, 2025. "Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance," Papers 2509.01265, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
• Guillermo Alonso Alvarez & Erhan Bayraktar & Ibrahim Ekren, 2025. "Contracting a crowd of heterogeneous agents," Papers 2507.09415, arXiv.org.
• Jonathan Bendor & Lukas Bolte & Nicole Immorlica & Matthew O. Jackson, 2025. "Interactions across multiple games: cooperation, corruption, and organizational design," Papers 2507.03030, arXiv.org.
• Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2025. "Oligopoly, Complementarities, and Transformed Potentials," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_644_v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, revised Jul 2025.
• Daniel Rehsmann & B'eatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2025. "Contesting fake news," Papers 2508.19837, arXiv.org.
• Abinash Panda & Anup Pramanik & Ragini Saxena, 2025. "Local Strategy-Proofness and Dictatorship," Papers 2507.00913, arXiv.org.
• Florian Brandl & Andrew Mackenzie, 2025. "Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled," Papers 2508.09004, arXiv.org.
• Teddy Mekonnen, 2025. "Luck Out or Outpay? When a Monopoly Competes with a Public Option," Papers 2507.12779, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2025.
• Jorge Arenas M., 2024. "Market Size in Pricing Problems on Multi-sided Matching Platforms," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 1033, Central Bank of Chile.
• Federico Echenique & Sumit Goel & SangMok Lee, 2025. "Swap Bounded Envy," Papers 2508.09290, arXiv.org.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2025. "Hopping on an Earlier Flight: Optimal Waiting with Multiple Flights," NBER Working Papers 34169, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2025. "Robust Tournaments," Papers 2507.16348, arXiv.org.
• Ran Spiegler, 2025. "Machine-Learning to Trust," Papers 2507.10363, arXiv.org.
• Bontems, Philippe & Hamilton, Stephen F. & Lepore, Jason, 2025. "Sequential pricing on multisided platforms," TSE Working Papers 25-1658, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
• William A. Brock & Bo Chen & Steven N. Durlauf & Shlomo Weber, 2025. "Partial Language Acquisition: The Impact of Conformity," NBER Working Papers 34138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• José Ignacio Cuesta & Pietro Tebaldi, 2025. "Public Procurement vs. Regulated Competition in Selection Markets," NBER Working Papers 34141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Kawaguchi, Kohei & Qiu, Jeff & Yi, Zhang, 2025. "When is Minimum and Maximum RPM Competitive?: Demand Uncertainty and Retailer Competition," SocArXiv 7tcha_v1, Center for Open Science.
• Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2025. "Procedural Mixture Sets," Papers 2508.07588, arXiv.org.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2025. "A Model of the Babbage Firm," NBER Working Papers 34145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.