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Report NEP-DES-2022-01-31
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Camille Terrier & Parag A. Pathak & Kevin Ren, 2021, "From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29600, Dec.
- Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021, "School Choice and Loss Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9479.
- Yun Liu, 2021, "On the Equivalence of Two Competing Affirmative Actions in School Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2112.14074, Dec, revised Mar 2022.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo, 2021, "An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 111126, Dec.
- Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021, "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2112.06032, Dec.
- Sam Ganzfried, 2022, "Safe Equilibrium," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2201.04266, Jan, revised Aug 2023.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2021, "On the Fair Division of a Random Object," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-03507995, Mar, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.3973.
- Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2022, "Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2201.01149, Jan, revised Aug 2022.