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Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

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  • Dimitrov, Dinko
  • Chin Sung, Shao

Abstract

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitrov, Dinko & Chin Sung, Shao, 2011. "Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 115722, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:115722
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.115722
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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