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Inessentiality of Large Groups and the Approximate Core Property: An Equivalence Theorem

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  • Wooders, Myrna Holtz

Abstract

Inessentiality of large groups or, in other words, effectiveness of small groups, means that almost all gains to group formation can be realized by partitions of the players into groups bounded in absolute size. The approximate cores property is that all sufficiently large games have nonempty approximate cores. I consider these properties in a framework of games in characteristic function form satisfying a mild boundedness condition where, when the games have many players, most players have many substitutes. I show that large (finite) games satisfy inessentially of large groups if and only if they satisfy the approximate core property.

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  • Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1992. "Inessentiality of Large Groups and the Approximate Core Property: An Equivalence Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 129-147, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:1:p:129-47
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    Cited by:

    1. Nizar Allouch & Myrna Wooders, 2017. "On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 191-209.
    2. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 87-120.
    3. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Flam, Sjur & Owen, Guillermo & Saboya, Martha, 2005. "The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 279-297, November.
    5. Myrna Wooders, 2013. "Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 11-21, March.
    6. Nizar Allouch & Myrna Wooders, 2004. "Price Taking Equilibrium in Club Economies with Multiple Memberships and Unbounded Club Sizes," Working Papers 513, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 295-309, December.
    8. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    9. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999. "A law of scarcity for games," Working Papers mwooders-00-05, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.
    11. Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Games with Many Players and Abstract Economies Permitting Differentiated Commodities, Clubs, and Public Goods," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0813, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Myrna Wooders, 2010. "Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 131-162.
    13. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 888-906, July.
    14. Yokota, Koji, 2012. "Time Discount and Convex Hiring Cost," ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation) 10252/4850, Otaru University of Commerce.
    15. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2015. "Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2015-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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