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Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution

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  • Kampas, Athanasios
  • White, Ben

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  • Kampas, Athanasios & White, Ben, 2003. "Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 135-147, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:47:y:2003:i:2-3:p:135-147
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    Cited by:

    1. der Straeten, Bart Van & Buysse, Jeroen & Nolte, Stephan & Lauwers, Ludwig & Claeys, Dakerlia & Van Huylenbroeck, Guido, 2011. "Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2098-2104, September.
    2. Daigneault, Adam & Greenhalgh, Suzie & Samarasinghe, Oshadhi, 2017. "Equitably slicing the pie: Water policy and allocation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 449-459.
    3. Ramilan, Thiagarajah & Scrimgeour, Frank G., 2006. "Abatement Cost Heterogeneity and its Impact on Tradable Nitrogen Discharge Permits," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31972, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    4. Kampas, Athanasios & Mamalis, Spyridon, 2006. "Assessing the Distributional Impacts of Transferable Pollution Permits: The Case of Phosphorus Pollution Management at a River Basin Scale," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 7(2), August.
    5. Breen, James P. & Donnellan, Trevor & Westhoff, Patrick C., 2012. "Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Irish Agriculture: A market-based approach," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 130555, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4069 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2013. "Policy Instruments for Water Quality Protection," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 111-138, June.

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