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Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution

  • Kampas, Athanasios
  • White, Ben

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (December)
Pages: 135-147

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:47:y:2003:i:2-3:p:135-147
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

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  1. Dijkstra, B.R. & Haan, M., 1999. "Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction," Research Report 99C08, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  2. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens & Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, 1998. "International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 25-51, July.
  3. Dagan, N. & Serrano, R. & Volij, O.C., 1994. "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Discussion Paper 1994-11, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Chen, Zhiqi, 1997. "Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 170-188, February.
  5. Shields, Deborah J. & Tolwinski, Boleslaw & Kent, Brian M., 1999. "Models for conflict resolution in ecosystem management," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 61-84, March.
  6. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
  7. Solomon, Barry D., 1999. "New directions in emissions trading: the potential contribution of new institutional economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 371-387, September.
  8. Escapa, Marta & Gutierrez, Maria Jose, 1997. "Distribution of Potential Gains from International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Greenhouse Effect," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-16, May.
  9. Chen, Mark A. & Maskin, Eric S., 1999. "Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 140-147, November.
  10. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers 197846, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  11. Neumayer, Eric, 2000. "In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 185-192, May.
  12. Cason Timothy N., 1993. "Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 177-195, September.
  13. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  14. Farrow, Scott, 1995. "The dual political economy of taxes and tradable permits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 217-220, August.
  15. Gupta, Sujata & M Bhandari, Preety, 1999. "An effective allocation criterion for CO2 emissions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 727-736, November.
  16. Rose, Adam & Stevens, Brandt, 1993. "The efficiency and equity of marketable permits for CO2 emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 117-146, March.
  17. Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quirion, 2002. "Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences," Post-Print halshs-00007264, HAL.
  18. Jeremy Richardson, 2000. "Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1006-1025, December.
  19. Atkinson, Scott & Tietenberg, Tom, 1991. "Market failure in incentive-based regulation: The case of emissions trading," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 17-31, July.
  20. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Economic theory and game theory 001, Nir Dagan.
  21. Wendong Tao & Bo Zhou & William Barron & Weimin Yang, 2000. "Tradable Discharge Permit System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, January.
  22. Andrew Moxey & Ben White, 1994. "Efficient Compliance With Agricultural Nitrate Pollution Standards," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 27-37.
  23. Ringius, Lasse & Torvanger, Asbjorn & Holtsmark, Bjart, 1998. "Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens?: OECD results from three burden sharing rules," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(10), pages 777-793, August.
  24. Randolph M. Lyon, 1982. "Auctions and Alternative Procedures for Allocating Pollution Rights," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(1), pages 16-32.
  25. Beavis, Brian & Walker, Martin, 1983. "Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 377-387, August.
  26. Hanley Hanley, 1992. "Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical analysis," Working Papers 842, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  27. Vatn, Arild, et al, 1997. "Regulating Nonpoint-," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 207-29.
  28. Ridgley, Mark A, 1996. "Fair sharing of greenhouse gas burdens," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 517-529, June.
  29. Antonio Villar Notario & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 2000. "The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions To Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconĂ³micas, S.A. (Ivie).
  30. Peter Bohm & Bjorn Larsen, 1994. "Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(3), pages 219-239, June.
  31. Tietenberg, Tom, 1998. "Ethical influences on the evolution of the US tradable permit approach to air pollution control," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 241-257, February.
  32. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
  33. Carsten Helm & Udo E. Simonis, 2001. "Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation," Environmental Values, White Horse Press, vol. 10(1), pages 5-18, February.
  34. John Norregaard & Valerie Reppelin, 2000. "Taxes and Tradable Permits As Instruments for Controlling Pollution; Theory and Practice," IMF Working Papers 00/13, International Monetary Fund.
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