Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy
Concentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood. This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading (CPT) system which can be fine-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration permits. A multi-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of defining the manure problem in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure problem.
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