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International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy


  • Adam Rose
  • Brandt Stevens
  • Jae Edmonds
  • Marshall Wise


ne of the major obstacles to reaching a comprehensive agreement on global warming is the setting of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for individual countries. Long-standing tensions between industrialized and developing countries have raised the issue of equity in burden-sharing. Moreover, individual industrialized nations have pleaded special circumstances and have sought differentiation in their obligations. This paper analyzes alternative rules for distributing tradable carbon dioxide emissions permits. A non-linear programming model, which distinguishes between allocation-based and outcome-based rules, is used to analyze the relative welfare outcomes. The model is applied to the world body of nations and yields several important policy implications. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens & Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, 1998. "International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 25-51, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:12:y:1998:i:1:p:25-51
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008262407777

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kverndokk, S., 1992. "Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem," Memorandum 23/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    2. William R. Cline, 1992. "Economics of Global Warming, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 39.
    3. Rose, Adam & Stevens, Brandt, 1993. "The efficiency and equity of marketable permits for CO2 emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 117-146, March.
    4. Eyckmans, Johan & Proost, Stef & Schokkaert, Erik, 1993. "Efficiency and Distribution in Greenhouse Negotiations," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 363-397.
    5. Kneese, Allen V. & Schulze, William D., 1985. "Ethics and environmental economics," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics,in: A. V. Kneeseā€  & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 191-220 Elsevier.
    6. Larsen, Bjorn & Shah, Anwar, 1994. "Global Tradeable Carbon Permits, Participation Incentives, and Transfers," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 841-856, Supplemen.
    7. Kverndokk, S., 1992. "Global co2 Agreements: A Cost Efficient Approach," Memorandum 04/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    8. Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1993. "Global Environmental Risks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 65-86, Fall.
    9. Rose, Adam, 1990. "Reducing conflict in global warming policy : The potential of equity as a unifying principle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(10), pages 927-935, December.
    10. Edmonds, Jae & Wise, Marshall & Barns, David W, 1995. "Carbon coalitions : The cost and effectiveness of energy agreements to alter trajectories of atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4-5), pages 309-335.
    11. Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, 1991. "Global CO2 Emission Reductions - the Impacts of Rising Energy Costs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 87-108.
    12. Nordhaus, William D., 1993. "Rolling the 'DICE': an optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 27-50, March.
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