The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations
We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationality for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish negotiations previous to a potential conflict, and negotiations during a conflict. In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from his willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the 'weak' player in the conflict can strategically profit from the mediator's quest for equity. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.
|Date of creation:||00 Feb 2004|
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