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Forward Contracting Specification Through Collective Bargaining

Listed author(s):
  • Chin, Ming-Chin
  • Weaver, Robert D.

Game-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing market price and income risk. Results clarify that collective bargaining can increase and stabilize producer profits when they face a single processor.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20006
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20006.

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Date of creation: 2004
Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20006
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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  3. Kinnucan, Henry W., 1995. "Price Bargaining Without Supply Control," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(01), pages 119-127, April.
  4. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
  5. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul, 2002. "Information Sharing and Oligopoly in Agricultural Markets: The Role of Bargaining Associations," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 02-wp313, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  6. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-430, March.
  7. Venturini, Luciano, 1998. "Countervailing Power And Antitrust Policy In The Food System," Conference Papers 14489, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
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