Stakeholder bargaining games
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995.
"Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003.
"Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict,"
Game Theory and Information
- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- repec:fth:tilbur:99121 is not listed on IDEAS
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