The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stennek, Johan, 2014. "Exclusive quality – Why exclusive distribution may benefit the TV-viewers," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 42-57.
- Carlsson, Mikael & Westermark, Andreas, 2011.
"The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, pages 579-603.
- Mikael Carlsson & Andreas Westermark, 2011. "The new keynesian phillips curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor," Post-Print hal-00781342, HAL.
- Galasso, Alberto, 2010. "Over-confidence may reduce negotiation delay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 716-733, December.
- Blomgren-Hansen, Niels, 2012. "Optimum organization of the labor market in a small open economy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 222-231.
More about this item
KeywordsBargaining; Inefficiencies; Strategic discrimination; Substitutability; C72; C78; L10;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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