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Bilateral Oligopoly

Listed author(s):
  • Jonas Björnerstedt
  • Johan Stennek

In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings over contracts specifying price and quantity, between pairs of buyers and sellers. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration. The law of one price does not hold. Prices depend on concentration of capital and concentration of sales. If the quantity sold represents a small share of both the firms’ sales and purchases, the price is close to the Walrasian price. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Bilaterales Oligopol) Auf vielen Märkten für Zwischenprodukte verfügen beide, Käufer und Verkäufer, über Marktmacht. Die Verträge, die üblicherweise langfristig abgeschlossen und bilateral verhandelt werden, legen zahlreiche über den Preis hinausgehende Elemente fest. In diesem Beitrag werden derartige Oligopole als simultane Rubinstein-Ståhl Verhandlungen über Verträge modelliert, die Preise und Mengen zwischen Paaren von Käufern und Verkäufern spezifizieren. Die Gleichgewichtsmengen sind unabhängig von der Konzentration effizient. Das Gesetz des einzigen Preises gilt nicht. Die Preise hängen von der Kapital- und Anbieterkonzentration ab. Wenn die Verkaufsmenge im Verhältnis zum Gesamtabsatz und dem Einkaufsvolumen der Unternehmen klein ist, dann kommt der Preis dem Walrasschen Preis nahe.

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Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number FS IV 01-08.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2001
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv01-08
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