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Vertical bargaining and countervailing power

Abstract

We study the existence of countervailing buyer power in a vertical industry where the input price is set via Nash bargainings between one upstream supplier and many differentiated but competing retailers. In case one bilateral bargaining fails, the supplier still has the ability to sell to the other retailers. We show that the capacity of these other retailers to react in the final market has a dramatic impact on the supplier’s outside options and, ultimately, on input prices and welfare. Under downstream quantity competition, we find either no or opposite support to the hypothesis of countervailing power on input prices, as the retail industry becomes more concentrated. With price competition, we find a case for countervailing power, but its existence depends on the degree of product differentiation and on the ability of competing retailers to react to a disagreement.

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Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 160.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 28 May 2010
Date of revision: 28 May 2010
Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:160
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Keywords: Countervailing buyer power; Nash bargaining.;

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  • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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  1. Mónica Correa-López, 2007. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 469-505, 06.
  2. Lopez, Monica Correa & Naylor, Robin A., 2004. "The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 681-696, June.
  3. Gregory S. Crawford & Ali Yurukoglu, 2012. "The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 643-685, April.
  4. Esther Gal-Or & Anthony Dukes, 2006. "On the Profitability of Media Mergers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(2), pages 489-526, March.
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  8. Robert C. Marshall & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "Pattern Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 239-255, 02.
  9. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Stennek, Johan, 2001. "Bilateral Oligopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 2864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Chen, Zhiqi, 2003. " Dominant Retailers and the Countervailing-Power Hypothesis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 612-625, Winter.
  11. George Symeonidis, 2008. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 247-270, 03.
  12. Dobson, Paul W., 1994. "Multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 87-100, January.
  13. Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Price discrimination in input markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19.
  14. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  15. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. " Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  16. Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-1142, December.
  17. Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
  18. Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2007. "The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 935-962, October.
  19. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
  20. von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, 1996. "Countervailing power revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 507-519, June.
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Cited by:

  1. Haskel, Jonathan & Iozzi, Alberto & Valletti, Tommaso, 2013. "Market structure, countervailing power and price discrimination: The case of airports," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 12-26.
  2. Noriaki Matsushima & Shohei Yoshida, 2016. "The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters," ISER Discussion Paper 0981, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. Noriaki Matsushima & Shohei Yoshida & Noriaki Matsushima & Shohei Yoshida, 2016. "Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
    [The Countervailing Power Hypothesis when Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters]    ," ISER Discussion Paper 0981r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2017.
  4. You, Jing & Imai, Katsushi S. & Gaiha, Raghav, 2016. "Declining Nutrient Intake in a Growing China: Does Household Heterogeneity Matter?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 171-191.
  5. E. Bacchiega & O. Bonroy & E. Petrakis, 2016. "Contract contingency in vertically related markets," Working Papers wp1079, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Noriaki Matsushima & Laixun Zhao, 2015. "Strategic dual sourcing as a driver for free revealing of innovation," ISER Discussion Paper 0936, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  7. Aghadadashli, Hamid & Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 291-294.
  8. Mérel, Pierre & Sexton, Richard J., 2017. "Buyer power with atomistic upstream entry: Can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 259-293.
  9. Ursino Giovanni, 2015. "Supply Chain Control: A Theory of Vertical Integration," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 1831-1866, October.
  10. Bonnet, Céline & Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra & Molina, Hugo, 2016. "The Welfare Effects of Brand Portfolio Strategies in the Soft Drink Industry: A Structural Bargaining Approach with Limited Data," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 245168, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  11. Gaudin, Germain, 2017. "Vertical bargaining and retail competition: What drives countervailing power?," DICE Discussion Papers 195, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  12. Ioannis Pinopoulos, 2017. "Input price discrimination, two-part tariff contracts and bargaining," Discussion Paper Series 2017_01, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jan 2017.

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