Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements
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- Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen & Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 070818, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2008. "Informational benefits of international environmental agreements," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0814, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd & Vijverberg, Wim P. M., 2003. "The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 337-362, February.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kimiko Terai, 2012.
"Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 297-308.
- Aline Chiabai & Chiara Travisi & Anil Markandya & Helen Ding & Paulo Nunes, 2010. "Economic Assessment of Forest Ecosystem Services Losses: Cost of Policy Inaction," Working Papers 2010-13, BC3.
- Alexandre Sauquet, 2014.
"Exploring the nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements: the case of the Kyoto Protocol,"
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- Alexandre Sauquet, 2014. "Exploring the nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements: the case of the Kyoto Protocol," Post-Print halshs-00977441, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsEnvironmental policy; International agreements; Signaling; Regulation;
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2008-02-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-02-16 (Regulation)
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