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Why Cooperate? Public Goods, Economic Power, and the Montreal Protocol


  • Kurt J. Beron

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • James C. Murdoch

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • Wim P. M. Vijverberg

    (University of Texas at Dallas)


This paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public-goods component or some other forms of interdependency. The key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents. In particular, we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Specifically, we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the Protocol, and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. Hence, the data suggest that, with respect to the Montreal Protocol, most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations. © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurt J. Beron & James C. Murdoch & Wim P. M. Vijverberg, 2003. "Why Cooperate? Public Goods, Economic Power, and the Montreal Protocol," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(2), pages 286-297, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:85:y:2003:i:2:p:286-297

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