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Non-Expected Utility and The Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm: Discussion


  • Edi Karni

    (Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, 21218-2685 Baltimore, MD)


This paper discusses some aspects of the robustness of the classical insurance paradigm with respect to departures from the independence axiom of expected utility theory. The discussion focuses on the significance of the distinction between risk aversion and outcome convexity and the role of smoothness of the preferences in non-expected-utility analysis of insurance. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1995) 20, 51–56. doi:10.1007/BF01098957

Suggested Citation

  • Edi Karni, 1995. "Non-Expected Utility and The Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm: Discussion," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(1), pages 51-56, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:20:y:1995:i:1:p:51-56

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    4. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, 2001. "Insurance Contracts and Securitization," CESifo Working Paper Series 559, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Safra, Zvi & Segal, Uzi, 2002. "On the Economic Meaning of Machina's Frechet Differentiability Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 450-461, June.
    3. Robert F. Nau, 2003. "A Generalization of Pratt-Arrow Measure to Nonexpected-Utility Preferences and Inseparable Probability and Utility," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1089-1104, August.

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