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Adverse Selection When Loss Severities Differ: First-Best and Costly Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Neil A. Doherty

    (Department of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 304 CPC, 3641 Locust Walk, 19104 Philadelphia PA)

  • Hong Joo Jung

    (Department of International Trade, College of Business, Sung Kyun Kwan University, 110-745 Seoul Korea)

Abstract

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1993) 18, 173–182. doi:10.1007/BF01111468

Suggested Citation

  • Neil A. Doherty & Hong Joo Jung, 1993. "Adverse Selection When Loss Severities Differ: First-Best and Costly Equilibria," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 173-182, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:18:y:1993:i:2:p:173-182
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
    2. James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, 2008. "Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 825-846, December.
    3. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. David Alary & Franck Bien, 2019. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk," Working Papers hal-02390017, HAL.
    5. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    6. Martin Boyer & Franca Glenzer, 2016. "Pensions, annuities, and long-term care insurance: On the impact of risk screening," Cahiers de recherche 1603, Chaire de recherche Industrielle Alliance sur les enjeux économiques des changements démographiques.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6456 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ramsay, Colin M. & Oguledo, Victor I. & Pathak, Priya, 2013. "Pricing high-risk and low-risk insurance contracts with incomplete information and production costs," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 606-614.
    9. S. Hun Seog, 2009. "Insurance Markets With Differential Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 279-294, June.
    10. ALARY David & BIEN F., 2008. "Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk," LERNA Working Papers 08.06.250, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

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