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Developments in Risk and Insurance Economics: The Past 50 Years

In: Handbook of Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Henri Loubergé

    (GSEM – Geneva School of Economics and Management)

  • Georges Dionne

    (Canada Research Chair in Risk Management and Finance Department, HEC Montréal)

Abstract

This chapter reviews the evolution in risk and insurance economics over the past 50 years, first recalling the situation in 1973 and then presenting the developments and new approaches that have flourished since then. We argue that these developments were only possible because steady advances were made in the economics of risk and uncertainty and in financial theory. Insurance economics has grown in importance to become a central theme in modern economics, providing not only practical examples and original data to illustrate new theories but also inspiring new ideas that are relevant to the overall economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Henri Loubergé & Georges Dionne, 2025. "Developments in Risk and Insurance Economics: The Past 50 Years," Springer Books, in: Georges Dionne (ed.), Handbook of Insurance, edition 0, pages 3-52, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-69561-2_1
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-69561-2_1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2011. "Liquidity management and corporate demand for hedging and insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 303-323, July.
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    7. Neil Doherty & Richard Phillips, 2002. "Keeping up with the Joneses: Changing Rating Standards and the Buildup of Capital by U.S. Property-Liability Insurers," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 55-78, February.
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    9. Narjess Boubakri, 2011. "Corporate Governance and Issues From the Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(3), pages 501-518, September.
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    12. Jianli Wang & Jingyuan Li, 2015. "Precautionary Effort: Another Trait for Prudence," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(4), pages 977-983, December.
    13. Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance economics; Optimal insurance protection; Optimal self-protection; Insurance pricing; Insurance demand; Economics of risk and uncertainty; Financial economics; Risk management; Asymmetric information; Insurance markets; Climate finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A33 - General Economics and Teaching - - Multisubject Collective Works - - - Handbooks
    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G52 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Insurance
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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