IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/16738.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Simple Test of Private Information in the Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurance Demand

Author

Listed:
  • Li Gan
  • Feng Huang
  • Adalbert Mayer

Abstract

A positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk can be an indicator for private information in insurance markets. However, this test fails if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We propose a new test that conditions on unobserved types of individuals who differ in their risks preferences. This makes it possible to detect asymmetric information without direct evidence of private information - even if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We apply our technique to the market for long-term care insurance. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) provide direct evidence for the existence of private information in this market. At the same time they fail to find a positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk. Our method indicates the existence of private information, without using direct evidence of private information. Our methodology is applicable to other insurance markets and markets where proxies for private information are not available.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Gan & Feng Huang & Adalbert Mayer, 2011. "A Simple Test of Private Information in the Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurance Demand," NBER Working Papers 16738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16738
    Note: AG HC HE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16738.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003. "Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1703-1729, December.
    2. Li Gan & Roberto Mosquera, 2008. "An Empirical Study of the Credit Market with Unobserved Consumer Typers," NBER Working Papers 13873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    4. He, Daifeng, 2009. "The life insurance market: Asymmetric information revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1090-1097, October.
    5. Smart, Michael, 2000. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-169, February.
    6. Keane, Michael P & Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1997. "The Career Decisions of Young Men," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 473-522, June.
    7. Tomas Philipson & John Cawley, 1999. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 827-846, September.
    8. Alma Cohen, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 197-207, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Diego Escobari & Alejandro Serrano, 2016. "Reducing asymmetric information in venture capital backed IPOs," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 42(6), pages 553-568, June.
    2. Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez & Yanyan Liu, 2013. "Group Lending with Heterogeneous Types," NBER Working Papers 18847, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Spindler, Martin, 2013. "“They do know what they are doing... at least most of them.†Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance," MEA discussion paper series 201209, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    4. Ciprian Matis & Eugenia Matis, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
    5. repec:mea:meawpa:12260 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Spindler, M., 2014. "“They do know what they are doing ... at least most of them.†Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 14/16, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16738. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.