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Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions

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  • James A. Ligon
  • Paul D. Thistle

Abstract

The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their screening properties, coinsurance and deductibles may both be equilibrium forms of risk sharing for a particular insurer facing asymmetric information, with different rationed consumers choosing different risk‐sharing provisions.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, 2008. "Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 825-846, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:75:y:2008:i:4:p:825-846
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2008.00287.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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