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Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa L. Posey

    (Pennsylvania State University)

  • Paul D. Thistle

    (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Abstract

We analyze whether allowing the choice between full tort and limited tort coverage can serve as a screening mechanism in automobile insurance markets with asymmetric information. We show that limited tort policies create an externality on the market. Using a model of price competition where menus of contracts can be offered, and drivers choose their level of safety effort, we show that there can exist a separating equilibrium where low risks choose full tort contracts and high risks choose limited tort contracts. There also can exist pooling equilibria at the full tort or the limited tort contracts. We show that equilibria without limited tort policies and equilibria that include limited tort policies are mutually exclusive. We also show that, relative to an exclusively full tort system, a choice system is no worse and leads to a Pareto improvement if a separating or limited tort pooling equilibrium is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017. "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 141-170, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:42:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1057_s10713-017-0022-7
    DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0022-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; contracts; no-fault insurance; tort law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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