The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of no-fault automobile insurance on fatal accident rates. As a mechanism for compensating the victims of automobile accidents, no-fault insurance has several important advantages over the tort system. However, by restricting access to tort, no-fault may weaken incentives for careful driving and lead to higher accident rates. We conduct an empirical analysis of automobile accident fatality rates in all U.S. states over the period 1968-94, controlling for the potential endogeneity of no-fault laws. The results support the hypothesis that no-fault is significantly associated with higher fatal accident rates than tort. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.
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