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Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard


  • Dionne, G.
  • St-Michel, P.


Notre Objectif Consiste a Presenter une Etude Empirique de la Mesure de L'ampleur de Cette Seconde Forme de Risque Moral Dans le Marche de L'indemnisation des Lesions Professionnelles. le Principal Defi Que Pose Cet Objectif Est la Distinction En Deux Parties de la Variation Totale de la Consommation Consecutive au Changement du Regime D'assurance a Savoir: 1- L'effet de Re-Allocation des Ressources Dans un Contexte de Parfaite Information et 2- la Variation de la Consommation Decoulant de L'information Asymmetrique la Methodologie Preconisee Dans Cette Etude Isole la Variation de Consommation Attribuable au Risque de la Variation Totale de Consommation.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8831

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Barten, A. P., 1969. "Maximum likelihood estimation of a complete system of demand equations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 7-73.
    2. Diewert, Walter E & Wales, Terence J, 1987. "Flexible Functional Forms and Global Curvature Conditions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 43-68, January.
    3. Kim, Moshe, 1984. "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 227-241, April.
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    Moral Hazard ; Workers;


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