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Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l'assurance automobile (1992) au Québec

  • G. Dionne
  • C. Vanasse

Le but de cette recherche etait d'evaluer l'effet de changement de tarification de 1992 sur la securite routiere au Quebec. Nos resultats indiquent que le changement de tarification a reduit les nombres d'infractions et les nombres d'accidents, deux variables qui mesurent directement la non prevention routiere.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 97-22.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:97-22
Contact details of provider: Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
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Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
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  1. Dionne, G. & Vanasse, C., 1988. "Automobile Insurance Ratemaking In The Presence Of Asymmetric Information," Cahiers de recherche 8834, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Picard Pierre, 1986. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8602, CEPREMAP.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Gourieroux, C. & Visser, M., 1997. "A count data model with unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 247-268, August.
  5. Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, P. & Salanié, B., 1989. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets," DELTA Working Papers 89-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  6. Hausman, Jerry A, 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-71, November.
  7. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-44, April.
  8. Gourieroux Christian & Monfort Alain & Trognon A, 1982. "Pseudo maximum lilelihood methods : applications to poisson models," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8203, CEPREMAP.
  9. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
  10. Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
  11. Jerry A. Hausman & Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi Griliches, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," NBER Technical Working Papers 0017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Chassagnon, A. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition," Papers 28, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
  13. Boyer, M. & Dionee, G. & Vanasse, C., 1990. "Econometric Models of Accident Distributions," Cahiers de recherche 9001, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  14. Claude Fluet & François Pannequin, 1995. "Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Random Loss Severity," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9510, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  15. Devlin, R.A., 1988. "Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis Of The Experience In Quebec," Working Papers 88126, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics.
  16. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
  17. Rose Anne Devlin, 1993. "Automobile Insurance in Ontario: Public Policy and Private Interests," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 19(3), pages 298-310, September.
  18. Cameron, A Colin & Trivedi, Pravin K, 1986. "Econometric Models Based on Count Data: Comparisons and Applications of Some Estimators and Tests," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 1(1), pages 29-53, January.
  19. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September.
  20. Devlin, R.A., 1988. "Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis Of The Experience In Quebec," Working Papers 88126, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics.
  21. Dionne, G. & Gourieroux, C. & Vanasse, C., 1998. "Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 98-09, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  22. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
  23. Dahlby, B. G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, February.
  24. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  25. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521818551 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
  27. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1987. "Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 13(2), pages 181-195, June.
  28. Boyer, Marcel & Dionne, Georges, 1989. "An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(1), pages 128-34, February.
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